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Some philosophers think that intuitions are a source of justification,
and in particular a source of justification for beliefs about abstract
matters, such as numbers, shapes, freedom, truth, and beauty. Other
philosophers are more skeptical. They doubt that intuitions are a
source of justification for beliefs about abstract matters, though they
might concede that intuitions are a source of justification for beliefs
about what our own implicit theories about numbers, shapes, freedom,
truth, and beauty are. The motivation to defend one or the other of
these orientations, non-skeptical or skeptical, drives most discussions
about intuition. As a consequence most of these discussions focus on
issues that seem to bear immediately on the epistemological status of
intuitions: Are intuitions reliable? How could they justify beliefs about
abstract matters? Do recent experimental studies of intuition provide
reason for skepticism about intuition? Is skepticism about intuition
coherent?2
Prior to all these questions, however, is the question: What are intu-
itions? Depending on what intuitions are, they might or might not be
reliable, they might or might not possibly justify beliefs about abstract
matters, they might or might not be embarrassed by recent experimen-
tal studies, and they might or might not be coherently foresworn.
1 Thanks to Selim Berker, John Biro, Aron Edidin, Robert D’Amico, Ned Hall, Kirk
Ludwig, Charles Parsons, Jim Pryor, Greg Ray, Susanna Siegel, Alison Simmons,
Ernie Sosa, Anand Vaidya , and Gene Witmer for helpful discussion of earlier ver-
sions of this work. John Bengson provided detailed comments on the most recent
versions of it, and this input has been invaluable in shaping it into its present form.
2 The bibliography contains references to relevant papers. Bealer and Sosa discuss the
reliability of intuition; see (Bealer 1998, 2000), and (Sosa 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007,
2008). (Benacerraf 1973) and (Field 1989) raise metaphysical challenges to the view
that intuitions can justify beliefs. (French 2007) and (Knobe and Nichols 2008) con-
tain representative experimental work on intuition. (Bealer 1992) discusses the
coherence of skepticism about intuition.
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One sort of view of intuition is doxastic. Doxastic views of intuition
are views according to which intuitions are, or are acquisitions of, dox-
astic attitudes or doxastic dispositions.3 The simplest doxastic view is
that intuitions are judgments. Most doxasticists think that intuitions
are a special kind of judgment, perhaps pre-theoretical or spontaneous.
And many doxasticists think that intuitions are not quite judgments,
but are, rather, inclinations to make judgments.4 Another sort of view
of intuition is perceptualist. Perceptualist views of intuition are views
according to which intuitions—like perceptual experiences— are pre-
doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent
abstract matters as being a certain way. The idea is that in having an
intuition, it seems to you that abstract matters are a certain way. But it
is only if you take your intuition at face value that you judge or even
form an inclination to judge that abstract matters are the way they
seem to you to be. Perceptualist views differ from doxastic views in
that according to them intuitions are not identical to doxastic attitudes
or doxastic dispositions, but lead to doxastic attitudes and doxastic
dispositions when taken at face value.5
The disagreement between perceptualists and doxasticists is not
merely terminological. The reason why is that the two groups disagree
about what there is. Doxasticists deny that we have, in addition to
conscious judgments about or conscious inclinations to make judg-
ments about abstract matters, pre-doxastic experiences that represent
abstract matters as being a certain way. The disagreement, then, is
not about which items out of a pool of items both parties anteced-
ently agree exist to call intuitions. The disagreement is substantive.
Perceptualists recognize a distinctive kind of experience that they
think best plays the role of presumptive justification for our beliefs
about abstract matters. I will call such experiences intuition experi-
ences. Doxasticists deny that there are intuition experiences and think
that unless we are to be skeptics about intuition, we must find our
3 For ease of reading, I will often suppress ‘‘or are acquisitions of.’’
4 For doxastic views see: (Williamson 2004, 2005, 2007), (Goldman and Pust 1998);
(Schwitzgebel and Gopnik 1998). Most of the philosophers that consider intuitions
in an experimental setting are doxasticists; see the papers in (French 2007) and
(Knobe and Nichols 2008). According to Sosa, intuitions are ‘‘attractions to assent’’
(Sosa 2007). Attractions to assent could be things that invite assent. Sosa rejects this
understanding (pg. 54). They could be inclinations to assent. Sosa does not explicitly
endorse this understanding. They could be something else. Even if they are, they
seem to me to behave similar enough to inclinations to assent to count Sosa as a
doxasticist.
5 Bealer and Huemer defend perceptualism; see (Bealer 1998, 2000, and 2002), and
(Huemer 2001 and 2008). Husserl and Go¨del also defended perceptualist views of
intuition; see (Husserl 1975) and (Go¨del 1947).
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way to an understanding of how judgments, judgments of a certain
kind, or inclinations to make judgments can be what justify our
beliefs about abstract matters.
I believe that there are intuition experiences, that these intuition
experiences are our basic source of justification for beliefs about
abstract matters, and that a perceptualist view of intuition provides the
best theoretical setting within which to develop a non-skeptical
view about intuition. I will not attempt to argue for all of
these claims in this paper. In this paper I focus on the debate
between perceptualists and doxasticists. In particular, I focus on two
claims:
(DoxI1) Necessarily: If x has an intuition that p, then x judges,
or has an inclination to judge, that p.
(DoxI2) Necessarily: if x judges, or has an inclination to judge,
that p, then x has an intuition that p.
These claims constitute a first blush doxasticist view of intuition. Most
doxasticists defend more sophisticated claims, and in particular
wouldn’t commit themselves to anything as strong as (DoxI2). Never-
theless, these two claims form a useful focal point. While I will build
my case against doxasticism by directing criticism toward (DoxI1) and
(DoxI2), nothing in my arguments hinges on weaknesses unique to
them. All doxastic views of intuition that I am aware of entail claims
close enough to (DoxI1) and (DoxI2) to fall within the scope of my
discussion.
Here is the plan. In section 1, I will explore arguments against dox-
astic views of perception. The rest of the paper is aimed at defending
analogous arguments against doxastic views of intuition. Proceeding in
this way is intended both to challenge doxasticism about intuition, and
to highlight some important similarities between intuition and percep-
tion. In section 2, I take up (DoxI1), and in section 3, I take up
(DoxI2). In section 4, I will consider a positive consideration in favor
of doxasticism about intuition, and I will explain the response to this
consideration that I find most attractive.
1. Perceptual Experience
Doxastic theories of perception are theories according to which percep-
tual experiences are, or are acquisitions of, doxastic attitudes or dispo-
sitions. I will focus on doxastic theories of perception that entail the
following two conditionals:
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(DoxP1) Necessarily: If x has a perceptual experience repre-
senting that p, then x judges, or has an inclination to
judge, that p.
(DoxP2) Necessarily: If x judges, or has an inclination to
judge, that p, then x has a perceptual experience rep-
resenting that p.6
In this section I will describe two arguments. The first is against
(DoxP1). The second is against (DoxP2). My aim, however, is not to
refute a largely abandoned class of theories.7 Rather, it is to provide a
background for exploring a largely accepted class of theories—i.e. dox-
astic theories of intuition.
Against (DoxP1). Below are the famous Mu¨ller-Lyer lines.
You might know that the two lines are the same in length, but
still have a visual experience that represents the bottom line as
longer than the top line. The phenomenon is common: many visual
illusions persist even when you know that they are illusions. This is
an instance of what Evans calls ‘‘the belief-independence of the
states of the informational system’’—which states include perceptual
experiences.8
While perceptual experiences are belief-independent, doxastic atti-
tudes and inclinations are not. Since you know—and, let us suppose,
are quite sure—that the two Mu¨ller-Lyer lines are the same in length,
likely you will not judge, or form any inclination to judge, that the
bottom line is longer than the top line, even though this is what
6 Most doxasticists about perception defend more sophisticated claims, and in partic-
ular wouldn’t commit themselves to anything as strong as (DoxP2). The comments
I made in the introduction about (DoxI1) and (DoxI2) apply here.
7 Kathrin Glu¨er has recently defended a novel doxastic theory of perception; see
(Glu¨er 2009). The novelty is to shift from the ‘‘naı¨ve semantic’’ view that experi-
ences have contents of the form x is F to the ‘‘phenomenal semantic’’ view that
experiences have contents of the form x looks F. I am not convinced that this shift
is warranted, or that it provides enough resources to defend the doxastic theory of
perception. For just a bit more on this see footnote 11 below. I cannot discuss
Glu¨er’s interesting paper in any detail here, however.
8 See (Evans 1981), page 124.
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your visual experience represents. Reflection on this case suggests the
following as a general possibility: you might have a perceptual experi-
ence representing that p, while not judging, or forming any inclination
to judge, that p. That is:
Not-(DoxP1) Possibly: x has a perceptual experience represent-
ing that p and x does not judge, or have any
inclination to judge, that p.
Many philosophers accept Not-(DoxP1), and take it to be a good rea-
son to reject any doxastic theory of perception.9, 10, 11
Against (DoxP2). Contrast the following two cases: (A) JF is
blindfolded and someone tells him that the wall in front of him is
red. (B) JF isn’t blindfolded and he sees that the wall in front of him
is red. In both cases JF gains a bit of information about the wall in
front of him—that it is red—but there is a palpable difference
between them. In fact, there are many palpable differences between
them. I am interested in one in particular. In order to help isolate it,
John Foster asks us to imagine a variant on case (A). (A*) JF is
blindfolded but clairvoyant:
Thus suppose that, even when I am blindfolded, I only have to
focus my investigative attention in a certain direction to acquire, in
a cognitively direct way, the same putative information, with the
same conceptual content, as I would acquire if the blindfold we
removed and the relevant portion of the environment became visi-
ble.12
9 In addition to (Evans 1981) see, for example, (Jackson 1977), (Peacocke 1983),
(Searle 1983), (Foster 2001), and (Heumer 2001).
10 In defending doxasticism about perception, Armstrong proposed identifying per-
ceptual experiences with doxastic dispositions distinct from inclinations to make
judgments. See (Armstrong 1968), page 222. See (Jackson 1977) pages 40 – 42 and
(Foster 2001) pages 106 – 108 for criticism of Armstrong’s proposal. I find the crit-
icisms Jackson and Foster make compelling. I cannot, however, explore the pros-
pects of doxasticism about perception any further here.
11 Glu¨er suggests that in the Mu¨ller-Lyer case your perceptual experience is a belief
that the bottom line looks longer than the top, and that this is compatible with not
judging, or having any inclination to judge, that the bottom line is longer than the
top; (Glu¨er 2009). This move does not get the doxasticist off the hook, since there
are possible cases in which something x looks F to you, but in which you do not
believe (or judge, or have any inclination to judge) that x looks F. Suppose x is an
inscription in your own terrible handwriting of the word ‘‘cat.’’ You perceptually
represent it as an inscription of the word ‘‘cat,’’ but you recognize that it certainly
does not look like an inscription of the word ‘‘cat.’’
12 (Foster 2001), page 112.
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Cases (A*) and (B) are similar in many ways: in both, JF consciously
gains information about the wall in front of him in a way that does
not involve testimony, inference, memory, etc. But there is still a palpa-
ble difference:
[The difference is that] in the clairvoyant cases, as envisaged, there
is no provision for the presentational feel of phenomenal [i.e. per-
ceptual] experience—for the subjective impression that an instance
of the relevant type of environmental situation is directly pre-
sented.13
According to Foster, perceptual experiences have a presentational feel.
Sturgeon calls what I take to be the same property ‘‘scene-immediacy’’:
‘‘what it’s like to enjoy visual experience is for it to be as if objects
and their features are directly before the mind.’’14 I will call the
property Foster and Sturgeon are talking about presentational
phenomenology.15, 16
What is the nature of this presentational phenomenology? I
believe it is possible to make some limited headway on this question,
but I want to postpone taking it up till section 3 below. For now I
will suppose that we have a grip on the notion through acquain-
tance with presentational phenomenology in our own perceptual
experiences.
The possession of presentational phenomenology is another point of
difference between perceptual experiences and doxastic attitudes and
13 (Foster 2001), page 112.
14 (Sturgeon 2000), page 24. (Crane 2005) cites Sturgeon with approval.
15 The view that perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology is wide-
spread. Characterizations of it, however, vary. Compare, for example, McDowell’s
‘‘the presentness to one of the seen environment.’’ (McDowell 1994). Or Robin-
son’s ‘‘perception is presentational in a way that pure thought is not…It is because
perception presents features of the world that it is possible to go away and think
about them…’’ (Robinson 1994). Some characterizations carry implications of
object-dependence that I reject. Some philosophers take perception’s possession of
presentational phenomenology to have consequences that I reject—for example that
perceptual experience must have an act-object rather than an attitude-content struc-
ture; cf. (Pautz 2007).
16 John Bengson has pointed out to me that some philosophers call perception presen-
tational in order to mark out a different property of it. Contrast a conscious belief
that p with a perception that p. The belief and the perception represent p as being
true. But only the perception, let us say, presents p as being true. So, perceptual
experiences both present propositions as being true to us, and present objects and
features to us. In this paper I am using ‘‘presentational phenomenology’’ to pick
out the second property of perceptual experience. I think that the two properties
are distinct, that perceptual experiences have both of them, and that they have the
first because they have the second. These are substantive claims. I cannot defend
them here, but nor will I rely on them here.
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inclinations. Doxastic attitudes and inclinations do not possess presen-
tational phenomenology: it is quite possible for you judge or be
inclined to judge that the scene in front of you—or a scene quite dis-
tant from you—is a certain way without it being for you as if the
scene’s ‘‘objects and their features are directly before the mind.’’ Thus:
Not-(DoxP2) Possibly: x judges, or has an inclination to judge,
that p, and x does not have a perceptual experi-
ence representing that p.
It is worth pointing out that the considerations reviewed here do not
gain their importance merely because they refute (DoxP2). (DoxP2) is
easy to refute: you might judge, or form an inclination to judge, that p
because of testimony, inference, or memory. This simple refutation of
(DoxP2), however, does nothing to diminish the plausibility that there
is a nearby revision of (DoxP2) that is immune to it. A natural idea,
for example, is to focus on the etiology of judgments and inclinations
to make judgments: they must not derive from testimony, inference, or
memory. But set whatever etiological conditions you please, so long as
it is the etiology of a judgment or an inclination to make a judgment
that you are talking about, you will not have picked out a state that
has the presentational phenomenology characteristic of perceptual
experiences.
2. Intuition: Against (DoxI1)
The doxastic theories of intuition that I am focusing on entail two con-
ditionals. The first is (DoxI1). Here it is for reference:
(DoxI1) Necessarily: If x has an intuition that p, then x judges,
or has an inclination to judge, that p.
In this section I will do two things. First, I will briefly review an argu-
ment against (DoxI1) that parallels the argument against (DoxP1) dis-
cussed above. Second, I will defend this argument against a few recent
criticisms.
Here is the argument.17 Consider the Naı¨ve Comprehension Axiom:
(Naı¨ve Comp) For all conditions …x… there is a set
{x: …x…} containing all and only the things
meeting the condition.
17 The sort of argument I will describe appears in (Bealer 1998).
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Bealer knows that (Naı¨ve Comp) is false. Because he knows that it is
false, when he considers it, he does not judge that it is true, and he
does not have any inclination to judge that it is true. Still, he claims,
when he considers it, he has an intuition that it is true.
Consider another claim about sets:
(All Ordinals) There is a set {x: x is an ordinal} containing all
the ordinals.
I know that (All Ordinals) is false. Because I know that it is false, when
I consider it, I do not judge that it is true, and I do not have any incli-
nation to judge that it is true. Still, I claim, when I consider it, I have
an intuition that it is true.
These examples suggest that it is possible for you to have an intui-
tion representing that p, though you do not judge, or have any inclina-
tion to judge, that p. That is:
Not-(DoxI1) Possibly: x has an intuition that p and x does not
judge, or have any inclination to judge, that p.
There are obvious parallels between this argument against (DoxI1) and
the argument against (DoxP1) discussed above. The argument against
(DoxP1) commands widespread acceptance. The argument against
(DoxI1), however, has been found less compelling.
According to Williamson, when he considers (Naı¨ve Comp) he does
have an inclination to believe that it is true, but he resists this inclina-
tion because he knows better.18 This in itself is not enough to refute the
argument against (DoxI1). Both Bealer and Williamson know that
(Naı¨ve Comp) is false. But it might be that while Bealer’s knowledge
stops him from having any inclination to believe that it is true,
Williamson’s knowledge does not, though it does make him resist the
inclination to believe that it is true. You might strengthen Williamson’s
claim, however, to this. When Bealer claims not to have any inclination
to believe that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true, he is mistaken. Really he—like
Williamson—does have such an inclination, but—again like William-
son—he resists it. Bealer is confusing the resistance of an inclination
with the absence of an inclination.
The inclination (strengthened) Williamson takes Bealer to have is
either conscious or unconscious.19 Suppose it is unconscious. Then
18 See Williamson (2007), page 217. I quote the relevant passage below, in section 4.
19 The following dilemma defense of the argument against (DoxI1) also appears in
(Bengson 2010).
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perhaps Bealer really does have it, but just does not know that he does.
Suppose this is so. This does nothing to show that Bealer’s intuition
that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true is just his inclination to judge that (Naı¨ve
Comp) is true. The reason why is that his intuition is conscious, but
his inclination—by our current hypothesis—is not.20 Suppose, then,
that Bealer’s inclination is conscious. Then it is unclear why he should
miss it. Let me switch to my own case. Sometimes I am inclined to
judge that the senate will pass a decent health care bill, and sometimes
I am inclined to judge that it will not. I know what it is like to have
these inclinations. When I consider (All Ordinals) I do not experience
anything like one of these inclinations. Only a convincing error theory
would tempt me to revise this claim. But Williamson has not provided
one.
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux suggest a different response to the argu-
ment against (DoxI1). They distinguish between component and resul-
tant inclinations—where component and resultant inclinations work
like component and resultant vectors.21 Given this distinction, they dis-
tinguish between two claims Bealer might make:
(1) I have an intuition that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true, but I do not
have a resultant inclination to judge that it is true.
(2) I have an intuition that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true, but I do not
have any component inclination to judge that it is true.
Even if (1) is true, (2) might be false. That is: it is possible to have a
component inclination to judge that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true, but no
resultant inclination to judge that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true.
So far so good. But it is not clear what force this is supposed to
have against the argument against (DoxI1). Bealer should grant the
distinction and claim that he has neither any resultant nor any com-
ponent inclination to judge that (Naı¨ve Comp) is true. If this is
what he claims about himself, why think he is mistaken? Earlenb-
augh and Molyneux wind up in a position similar to (strengthened)
Williamson’s. Either the component inclination they think Bealer
has is conscious or it is unconscious. If unconscious, then it is not
20 Let me make this explicit: if Williamson were to succeed in arguing that whenever
one has an intuition that p, one has an unconscious inclination to judge that p,
then he would succeed in defending (DoxI1), but he would not succeed in defend-
ing doxasticism about intuition. Doxasticism about intuition entails (DoxI1), but
(DoxI1) does not entail doxasticism about intuition.
21 See (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009). Sosa makes a similar distinction; see (Sosa
2007).
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Bealer’s intuition. If conscious, then if Bealer really has it, he should
be able to tell that he does by introspection—unless there is some
good error theory explaining why not. Again, let me switch to my
own case. Sometimes I find myself both inclined to judge that the
senate will pass a decent health care bill and inclined to judge that
it will not. These are component inclinations. I know what they are
like. When I consider (All Ordinals) I do not experience anything
like one of them. Again, only a convincing error theory would tempt
me to revise this claim. But Earlenbaugh and Molyneux do not
provide one.
3. Intuition: Against (DoxI2)
(DoxI2), recall, is the following claim:
(DoxI2) Necessarily: if x judges, or has an inclination to judge,
that p, then x has an intuition that p.
In this section I want to develop an argument against (DoxI2) that is
similar to the argument against (DoxP2) discussed above. The impor-
tance of the argument is not that it refutes (DoxP2), but how it does
so. There are other, quicker ways to refute (DoxI2). The argument
I will develop, however, is not easily circumvented by modifying
(DoxI2) with, say, etiological conditions on judgments or inclinations
to make judgments: that they not derive from perception, testimony,
inference, or memory, that they derive solely from understanding or
conceptual competence, etc.22 But even more importantly, the argument
refutes (DoxP2) by drawing our attention to an often ignored phenome-
nological feature of intuition.
The main premise of the argument is that intuitions are similar to
perceptual experiences in possessing presentational phenomenology.
This claim has not played much of a role in recent discussions of intui-
tion. But a longer view of the subject reveals that many philosophers
have held it:
Whenever my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes
to mind, I cannot but admit that it would be very easy for him, if he
so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters
which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind’s eye. Yet when
I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I
am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whosoever
22 Cf. (Ludwig 2007), (Sosa 2007).
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can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that…two and three
added together are more or less than five…23
In an act of abstraction, which need not necessarily involve the
use of an abstract name, the universal itself is given to us; we do
not think of it merely in signitive fashion as when we merely
understand general names, but we apprehend it, behold it. Talk
of an intuition and, more precisely, of a perception of the univer-
sal is in this case, therefore, well-justified.24
We are thus forced to the conclusion that the knowledge which
we indubitably possess concerning relations involves acquain-
tance, either with the bare relations themselves, or at least with
something equally abstract…25
Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have
something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as
is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us
as being true.26
I take ‘‘turn[ing] to the things themselves,’’ having ‘‘the universal itself
given to us,’’ being ‘‘acquainted, either with the bare relations them-
selves, or at least with something equally abstract,’’ and having ‘‘some-
thing like a perception also of the objects of set theory’’ to be phrases
intended to pick out experiences that seem to—and, since these four
philosophers were neither nominalists nor skeptics about intuition,
genuinely do—present us with abstract objects and their features.27
23 (Descartes 1985), 3rd Meditation. Underlining added.
24 (Husserl 2001b), Logical Investigation 6. Italics in original; underlining added.
25 (Russell 1992), Theory of Knowledge, Chapter VII. Underlining added.
26 (Go¨del 1947), ‘‘What Is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?’’ Underlining added.
27 I cannot fully defend this interpretive claim here. I do want to mention two obvi-
ous worries, and suggest replies. First worry: Descartes is using ‘‘the things them-
selves’’ to pick out the propositions he seems to see clearly, not the objects and
features those propositions are about. The phrase ‘‘the things themselves’’ occurs in
the Rules as well; see Rule 8, page 32 in (Descartes 1985b). There it is used to pick
out ‘‘natures’’—Descartes’ earlier term for the objects of intuition. Descartes
includes propositions among the natures, but he also includes properties and indi-
viduals. Cf. (Grice 1991), page 187 ff. Second worry: Maybe Go¨del is using
‘‘objects of set theory’’ to mean propositions of set theory. Reply: Note that the
objects of set theory are contrasted with the axioms of set theory, and that it is our
perception of the objects that explains why the axioms force themselves upon us as
being true. ‘‘Perception of x’’ contrasts with ‘‘having p forced upon you as being
true’’: the former takes item-denoting complements; the latter takes proposition-
denoting complements.
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Descartes, Russell, Husserl, and Go¨del had different views about intui-
tion. But all seem to me to agree that Sturgeon’s claim about visual
perception—‘‘what it’s like to enjoy visual experience is for it to be as
if objects and their features are directly before the mind’’—has a true
analogue for intuition: what it’s like to enjoy intuition experience is for
it to be as if objects and their features are directly before the mind. So
there is some historical pedigree to the claim that intuitions have pre-
sentational phenomenology.
Historical pedigree is one thing. Truth, however, is another. Why
think that intuitions have presentational phenomenology? The philoso-
phers I have quoted adduced epistemic, semantic, and phenomenologi-
cal considerations in favor of thinking that intuitions have
presentational phenomenology.28 Here I will provide some phenomeno-
logical evidence for the view.
Let us imagine someone, Albert, intuiting a simple geometrical truth:
every diameter of a circle determines a line of symmetry for it. Here is
how Albert’s intuition might appear in his stream of consciousness:
Albert considers the proposition: every diameter of a circle determines
a line of symmetry for it. At first he does not know what to think
about it. To tell whether the proposition is true, Albert sets out to
make himself better aware of what it is about. It is about circles,
diameters, and lines of symmetry. Albert exercises his visual imagina-
tion. He imagines an arbitrary circle and some of its diameters.
28 I must leave exploration of these various considerations to another occasion. Here
are a few remarks intended to clarify what I have in mind by the different sorts of
consideration. Russell tended to emphasize semantic considerations: he argued that
our ability to directly think about and refer to abstract objects is explained by
experiences that present, or acquaint us with, them. Why do these experiences also
seem to, or feel as if they, present, or acquaint us with, abstract objects? My inter-
pretive hypothesis is that this explains how we immediately know that we can
directly think about and refer to them. Husserl tended to emphasize epistemologi-
cal and phenomenological considerations. He argued, for example, that intuitions
are presentational because felt presence to mind of the items that a proposition is
about in general explains how we can acquire immediate justification for believing
the proposition. Go¨del’s remarks are scanty, but he seems to me to have had phe-
nomenological considerations in mind. The reason he gave for thinking intuitions
are presentational is that this explains the distinctive phenomenal character of the
way that certain mathematical propositions appear to us to be true.
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Circles are shapes of this kind, and diameters are line segments like
these that span the circle and pass through its midpoint, Albert thinks
while imagining a circle and its diameters. Albert thinks of the circle’s
lines of symmetry as those lines that cut it into halves so that folding
the circle over them makes the halves coincide. As Albert thinks and
imagines his way toward a better awareness of what circles are, what
diameters are, and what lines of symmetry are, all of a sudden things
fall into place: his thoughts and imaginings click together in a way
that makes it intuitively appear to him that every diameter of a circle
does indeed determine a line of symmetry for it. As a result Albert
judges that this is so.
Imagine yourself in Albert’s shoes. Contrast the two experiences: enter-
taining the proposition that diameters determine lines of symmetry,
and intuiting that diameters determine lines of symmetry. There is a felt
difference between them. The intuition represents the proposition as
being true. But that isn’t all. When the proposition that diameters
determine lines of symmetry intuitively appears to you to be true, it
does so in a way that seems grounded in your awareness of what cir-
cles, diameter, and lines of symmetry are—that is, in a felt presence to
mind of the properties of being a circle, being a diameter, and being a
line of symmetry.
This felt presence to mind of the properties can be elusive. Here is a
second example that might help to make it more readily isolable in
introspection. Consider the following clams:
(A) Every line of symmetry for a square is a line of symmetry for
a circle.
(B) Some lines of symmetry for a circle are not lines of symmetry
for a square.
You might convince yourself of (A) and (B) by imagining a circle and
a square, both centered on the origin, and imagining folding each over
various lines that pass the origin:
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While imagining the circle, the square, and the folding operation it might
intuitively appear to you that (A) is true, or that (B) is true, or that both
(A) and (B) are true. These are different intuitions: they have different
propositional contents. But I expect, and I do find for myself, that in each
case there is some common phenomenology. Further, this is not just
visual imagery, though there is that. Rather, there is—in addition—a
common sense of having a grip on what circles, squares, and lines of sym-
metry are. That is, there is a common feeling of presence to mind of the
properties of being a circle, being a square, and being a line of symmetry.
Suppose you are convinced: intuitions have presentational phenome-
nology. Then the rest of the argument against (DoxI2) is the same as
the argument against (DoxP2). From the claims that intuitions have
presentational phenomenology and judgments, and inclinations to
make judgments do not, we conclude:
Not-(DoxI2) Possibly: x judges, or has an inclination to judge,
that p, and x does not have an intuition repre-
senting that p.
As I pointed out above it isn’t clear what alternative to (DoxI2) doxas-
ticists might propose. No matter the etiology of a judgment, or an
inclination to make a judgment, so long as it is a judgment, or an incli-
nation to make a judgment, it will not have presentational phenome-
nology, and so will not be an intuition.29
There are three objections to the argument of this section that I
will consider. I will address the first two here, and the third in the next
section.
First objection. I grasp what presentational phenomenology is in the
case of perception. And I can see that you’ve pointed toward some
kind of phenomenology in the case of intuition. But why think it is
presentational phenomenology?
The objection calls for a characterization of presentational phenome-
nology that is abstract enough so that it is clear how both perceptual
experiences and intuition experiences can possess it. Here I will sketch
an approach to this project.
29 In (Chudnoff 2010) I considered, but did not endorse, the view that intuitions are
experiences in which you judge, or are inclined to judge, something and that pos-
sess presentational phenomenology; this view accepts (DoxI1) and rejects (DoxI2).
Call it semi-doxasticism. I believe semi-doxasticism is false because I accept the
arguments given above against (DoxI1). Setting those aside, however, it is a nice
question whether semi-doxasticism is ultimately coherent. I am doubtful, but can-
not take up the matter here.
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Philosophers of perception often distinguish between perception-of
and perception-that.30 Contrast the following two perceptual reports:
(1) Albert sees the rocket.
(2) Albert sees that the rocket has launched.
(1) and (2) report on different states: Albert might see the rocket with-
out seeing that it has launched; and Albert might see that the rocket
has launched without seeing the rocket, because, say, it is hidden by its
exhaust cloud.
I will introduce another distinction. This is a distinction between
seeming perception-of and seeming perception-that. Contrast the fol-
lowing two perceptual reports:
(3) Albert seems to see a rocket.
(4) Albert seems to see that a rocket has launched.
(3) and (4) report on different states: Albert might seem to see a rocket
without seeming to see that a rocket has launched; and Albert might
seem to see that a rocket has launched without seeming to see a rocket,
because, say, he only seems to see a rocket’s exhaust cloud. According
to some philosophers, seeming perception-of is just perception-of spe-
cial items such as sense-data, universals, or non-existent objects.31
According to other philosophers, seeming perception-of is a species of
seeming perception-that.32 I am not assuming any view on the matter.
Prior to theorizing about the natures of seeming perception-of and
seeming perception-that, we should at least recognize the intuitive dis-
tinction between them.
Suppose you look at your car and you seem to see that it is red.
Further, suppose you seem to see its color—its redness. In this case
you seem to see that p—that your car is red—and you seem to see
an item—your car’s redness—that makes it true that p. I take this
to be an example of presentational phenomenology. More generally:
if your perceptual experience is one in which it both seems to you
that p and in which you seem to be sensorily aware of an item
that makes it true that p, then I will say that your experience has
30 See, for example, (Chisholm 1957), (Warnock 1965), (Dretske 1969, 1995), (Arm-
strong 1969), (Jackson 1977), and (Johnston 2006).
31 See, respectively, Price (1950), Smith (2002), Johnston (2004).
32 See, for example, (Spelke 1995), Siegel (2006), or (Pautz 2008).
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presentational phenomenology with respect to p.33 Now suppose you
look at your car’s speedometer and you seem to see that your car is
moving at 60 m.p.h. You also seem to see an item, namely the
speedometer’s display. In this case you seem to see that p—that your
car is moving at 60 m.p.h.—and you seem to seen an item—your
car’s speedometer’s display—that does not make it true that p
(though you do seem to see an item that indicates that p). Your
visual experience represents that p, but it does not present an item
that makes it the case that p. If your perceptual experience is one in
which it seems to you that p, but in which you do not seem to be
sensorily aware of an item that makes it the case that p, then I will
say that your experience lacks presentational phenomenology with
respect to p.
Here is the sense in which I think perception in general is presenta-
tional: every perceptual experience has presentational phenomenology
with respect to some of its propositional content. In the second case just
discussed, for example, though your visual experience lacks presenta-
tional phenomenology with respect to the proposition that your car is
moving at 60 m.p.h., it has presentational phenomenology with respect
to another proposition that seems true in it, namely the proposition
that your car’s speedometer reads 60 m.p.h.
Here is a more regimented formulation of the thesis that perception
is presentational:
(Presentationality of Perception) Whenever you seem to per-
ceive that p, there is some q (maybe = p) such that—in the
33 A few clarifications are in order. A) ‘‘Seem to be sensorily aware of an item that
makes it true that p’’ should be read as a block. Do not read it as ‘‘there is an item
x such that you seem to be sensorily aware of x and x makes it true that p.’’ This
is mistaken in two ways. First, ‘‘seem to be sensorily aware’’ is opaque. Second,
this reading would entail that p is true. I take the phrase ‘‘seem to be sensorily
aware of an item that makes it true that p’’ to have the same form as ‘‘seem to see
a rocket.’’ B) I also take it as a primitive here. I will not try to analyze it further.
I think it helps to articulate what some philosophers are getting at in talking about
presentational phenomenology, but it does not provide a basis for a reductive
explanation, or an explanation in independently understandable terms. C) I am
using ‘‘seeming to be sensorily aware of an item that makes it true that p’’ to pick
out a determinable state. In particular perceptual experiences it is determined in
various ways: 1. The modality of the sensory awareness will be fixed, 2. The propo-
sition will be fixed, and 3. The truth-maker for the proposition will be fixed. D)
I do not think that seeming to be sensorily aware of an item that makes it true that
p requires that you have the concept of a truth-maker. I am using that concept to
pick out a kind of perceptual state, but I am not attributing possession of it to
those in perceptual states of that kind. I am open to there being a better way to
pick out the kind of state, one that better captures just how things appear to those
that are in states of the kind.
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same experience—you seem to perceive that q, and you seem
to be sensorily aware of an item that makes q true.34
There is a natural modification of this thesis that says that intuition is
presentational:
(Presentationality of Intuition) Whenever you seem to intuit
that p, there is some q (maybe = p) such that—in the same
experience—you seem to intuit that q, and you seem to be
intellectually aware of an item that makes q true.
Setting the two theses side by side should make clear the parallels
I intend to draw between perception and intuition in calling both pre-
sentational. Both are presentational because for both: whenever it
seems to you that p, there is some q (maybe = p) such that—in the
same experience—it seems to you that q, and you seem to be aware of
an item that makes q true. For perception, the seeming is perceptual
and the awareness sensory. For intuition, the seeming is intuitive and
the awareness intellectual.35
This characterization of presentational phenomenology is intended
to provide enough of a theoretical grip on the notion to meet the cur-
rent objection. It does not provide a full account of what presenta-
tional phenomenology consists in. And it does not provide a basis for
proving that intuitions have presentational phenomenology. To show
that they do requires phenomenological reflections of the sort pursued
above.36 What I claim for the foregoing is that it helps to illuminate
how what such reflections turn up is analogous to what similar reflec-
tions turn up when directed at perceptual experiences.
34 Compare: ‘‘whenever a person perceives-that p, he both believes that p and per-
ceives something which is relevant to p’s truth-value. For example, one believes
that the traffic lights are green, and sees the greenness of the traffic lights.’’
(O’Shaughnessy 2002). I do not agree with everything O’Shaughnessy says about
perception, nor with everything that the quoted statement implies about perception,
but the parallels between O’Shaughnessy’s statement and my own encourage me in
thinking that I am on to something. See, also, Johnston on the function of sensory
awareness; (Johnston 2006).
35 I am using ‘‘seeming intellectual awareness’’ to pick out a kind of phenomenology.
I illustrated this phenomenology above with Albert’s intuitions: Albert seemed to
be intellectually aware of the properties of being a circle, being a diameter, and
being a line of symmetry. There are difficult metaphysical issues associated with the
questions ‘‘Well was Albert genuinely intellectually aware of an abstract item such
as circularity? What could this awareness consist in?’’ I take these questions up
elsewhere; (Chudnoff ms).
36 I’m setting aside semantic and epistemological arguments for now.
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Second objection. Perhaps some intuitions have presentational phe-
nomenology. But why think that all intuitions have it? On the face of
it, some do not, such as my intuition that 1 + 1 = 2 or my intuition
that prima facie you ought not lie.
I must explain away—or at least show the prospects of explaining
away—the appearance that some intuitions lack presentational phe-
nomenology. I believe that this appearance derives from a few common
sources.
First, some states that we call intuitions do lack presentational phe-
nomenology. Suppose you perceive that the sky is blue, take your per-
ception at face value, and so form a perceptual belief that the sky is
blue. Later, you might recall the perceptual belief that the sky is blue,
though you do not re-perceive that the sky is blue. It would be wrong
to call the perceptual belief a perception, note that it lacks presenta-
tional phenomenology, and conclude that some perceptions lack pre-
sentational phenomenology. A slightly different, but related error can
create the appearance that some intuitions lack presentational phenom-
enology. Suppose you intuit that 1 + 1 = 2, take your intuition at
face value, and so form an intuitive belief that 1 + 1 = 2. Later, you
might recall the intuitive belief that 1 + 1 = 2. According to standard
usage—at least as it strikes me—it would not be wrong to call this intui-
tive belief an intuition. You might very well say, ‘‘I have an intuition
that 1 + 1 = 2.’’ Still, I think, it would be wrong to argue that some
intuitions lack presentational phenomenology because this intuitive
belief lacks presentational phenomenology. It would be wrong because
it would be committing the fallacy of equivocation. ‘‘Intuition’’ is
sometimes used to pick out experiences (intuition experiences) that lead
us to beliefs, and sometimes used to pick out beliefs (intuitive beliefs)
to which we are lead.
Second, presentational phenomenology can be elusive. By that
I mean it can be difficult to focus introspective attention on it. This is
not a problem for the presentational phenomenology of perception, but
it is a problem for the presentational phenomenology of intuition.
Why? The reason, I think, is that the presentational phenomenology of
intuition often occurs in conjunction with more impressive phenome-
nology, such as the phenomenology of visualizing, or imagining a situa-
tion in a thought experiment, or carefully thinking about the order of
the quantifiers in a proposition. These other experiences can be literally
attention-grabbing: they grab your attention and keep it to themselves
and away from the presentational phenomenology of intuition.
Third, presentational phenomenology can be difficult to describe.
Consider a situation like this. You are in a club looking for your
friend: your eyes are watery, the room is smoky, the lights are dim,
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and the crowd is dense. You seem to see your friend in the corner. But
your seeming awareness of the location of your friend is obscure.
Something similar can happen in intuition. You might intuit that prima
facie you ought not lie. And you might seem to be aware of a truth-
maker for this claim. But your seeming awareness might be obscure.37
We describe presentational phenomenology by describing what is
presented to us. So obscurity can affect our ability to describe our pre-
sentational phenomenology. Why should having difficulty describing it
lead to the appearance that it doesn’t exist? The reason why is that
the limited description we can give might not provide us with a
basis for distinguishing the phenomenology described from other non-
presentational phenomenology. Sometimes we really do have to turn to
the things themselves.38
Fourth, some intuitions lack presentational phenomenology with
respect to some of their content. Suppose you intuit that nothing is
self-diverse—i.e. nothing fails to be identical to itself.39 And suppose
you do not seem to be aware of a truth-maker for this proposition. It
doesn’t follow that your intuition lacks presentational phenomenology.
Your intuition that nothing is self-diverse might be like your perception
that your car is moving at 60 m.p.h. That is, in this case, perhaps you
also intuitively represent that everything is self-identical, and you seem
to be aware of a truth-maker for this proposition. In the perceptual
case the propositional content about the speedometer might not be the
object of your attention, but it still might exist. Similarly, in the intui-
tion case, the propositional content about self-identity might not be the
object of your attention, but it still might exist.
So, the presentational phenomenology of intuition can be elusive,
difficult to describe, and partial. I believe that these three properties
can be exploited in explaining away apparent examples of intuitions
lacking presentational phenomenology. Explanations in particular cases
will likely not generalize, so I will not pursue any here.
4. The Absent Intuition Challenge
The two objections I considered in the last section question claims
I made about intuitions, but do not question the very existence of
37 Here I follow the rationalist tradition in taking intuitions to exhibit variations in
clarity and distinctness.
38 ‘‘To the things themselves!’’ is an imperative associated with Husserl. The things
are our experiences. And the injunction, as I understand it, is intended to under-
score the need for first-person phenomenological reflection in achieving a clear view
of the natures of, similarities and differences between, structures exhibited in, and
constitutive connections among our experiences.
39 Ernie Sosa helped me to see the need to account for this example.
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intuitions as experiences distinct from conscious doxastic attitudes and
dispositions. The third does:
Third objection. When I introspect I do not find any intuitions dis-
tinct from my conscious judgments and conscious inclinations to make
judgments. Williamson presses this worry:
Although mathematical intuition can have a rich phenomenology,
even a quasi-perceptual one, for instance in geometry, the intellectual
appearance of the Gettier proposition is not like that. Any accompa-
nying imagery is irrelevant. For myself, I am aware of no intellectual
seeming beyond my conscious inclination to believe the Gettier propo-
sition. Similarly, I am aware of no intellectual seeming beyond my
conscious inclination to believe Naı¨ve Comprehension, which I resist
because I know better.40
There are a number of different challenges in this passage. First, there
is the challenge I discussed in section 2: this is a challenge to Bealer’s
argument that intuitions can occur in the absence of inclinations to
believe. Second, there is the worry that I discussed in section 3: though
some intuitions have ‘‘a rich phenomenology, even a quasi-perceptual
one,’’ not all intuitions do. Third, and finally, there is what I will call
the absent intuition challenge: Williamson—and other doxasti-
cists—claim not to find any intuition experiences when they peek into
their streams of consciousness.41
The least satisfying response to the absent intuition challenge is to
settle for a stalemate: Williamson and other doxasticists don’t find that
they have any intuition experiences; we perceptualists find that we do;
call it a draw. The most satisfying response is to insist that Williamson
and other doxasticists do sometimes have intuition experiences, and to
diagnose and repair their inability to find them. This is the response
that I will try to develop. It is an option because what you find in your
stream of consciousness does not just depend on what is there; it also
depends on what you are equipped to find. In order to find—not just
have—an intuition experience, your understanding of what intuition
experiences are shouldn’t be wildly mistaken. If your understanding of
what intuition experiences are is wildly mistaken, then you might very
well have many intuition experiences, but fail to recognize them as
such.
40 (Williamson 2007, pg 217).
41 They might go on to conclude something further: there are no intuition experi-
ences, or I—the doxasticist—have no reason to believe that there are, etc. I will set
these further claims aside. I am interested in responding to the mere first person
report.
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Contrast two different ways of looking for an intuition experience in
your stream of consciousness. The first way is to look for an experience
that occupies a location of its own, distinct from those occupied by your
thoughts, imaginings, intentions, beliefs, etc. The second way is to look
for an experience that is co-located with some of your thoughts, imagin-
ings, etc—that is, to look for some difference in your thoughts, imagin-
ings, etc. Doxasticists—I conjecture—pursue the first strategy. Here is an
apparent rationale for it: intuition experiences are supposed to be sui
generis, so they should occupy their own places in our streams of con-
sciousness.42 But this inference is invalid: intuition experiences can be
both sui generis—i.e. not identical to and not analyzable in terms of
thoughts, imaginings, etc—and co-located in our streams of conscious-
ness with our thoughts, imaginings, etc. How? They can be constituted by
our thoughts, imaginings, etc. When material objects—such as a lump of
clay and a statue—are distinct and co-located, that is a sign that one of
them—in this case the lump of clay—constitutes the other—in this case
the statue.43 Consider, as a hypothesis, the claim that intuitions are con-
stituted by and so co-located with thoughts, imaginings, etc. If this is the
correct understanding of intuition experiences, then the correct way to
look for them in your stream of consciousness is precisely not to look for
an experience that occupies a location of its own, distinct form those
occupied by your thoughts, imaginings, etc. You should examine your
thoughts, imaginings, etc and search for some difference in them: do they
organize together in some way and thereby constitute a new experience,
say an intuition experience representing that circles are symmetrical
about their diameters, or, for a non-geometrical example, that every nat-
ural number is bigger than at most a finite number of other natural num-
bers? I conjecture that if doxasticists were to do this, then they would
find that they do have intuition experiences.
The reply to the absent intuition challenge that I prefer, then, is this.
The challenge rests on a mistaken understanding of intuition experi-
ences. This understanding should be corrected by conceiving of intui-
tion experiences as constituted by thoughts, imaginings, intentions,
beliefs, etc. With such a corrected understanding in place, the method
of looking for intuition experiences in your stream of consciousness
should become clearer, and the absent intuition challenge should no
longer retain its grip.
What I want to do now is fill out idea that intuition experiences
are constituted by other experiences, such as conscious thoughts,
42 Bealer, for example, defends the claim that that intuitions are sui generis proposi-
tional attitudes; see (Bealer 1998).
43 It is a defeasible sign—but a sign nonetheless.
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imaginings, etc. I find this view of intuition experiences attractive
because it seems to me to provide the best theoretical setting within
which to explain various phenomenological, epistemological, and
metaphysical aspects of intuition. I cannot elaborate on the full
motivation for the view in this paper.44 What will try to do here is
make it clearer and more plausible by making a few explanatory
points.
The first is about the constitution relation. I take the constitution
relation that holds between intuition experiences and collections of
other experiences to be the very same one that holds between statues
and lumps of clay, and between dollar bills and pieces of paper. But, it
is natural to ask, what relation is that?
I do not know how to give non-circular, necessary and sufficient
conditions for x to constitute y at t. What I will do, instead, is set out
a handful of theses about constitution, which—in conjunction with the
examples given—should help to clarify what I take constitution to be.
All of the theses are controversial.45 My aim here is not to defend
them, but simply to use them to explain how I understand the constitu-
tion relation.
There are six theses: (I) Constitution is not composition: constitution
is a relationship between two items, not, like composition, a relation
between a plurality (some parts) and an item (a whole).46 (II) Constitu-
tion is not identity: I accept modal arguments for distinctness. (III) A
structured whole—such as a bicycle—is an item that is constituted by a
mereological sum—a sum of bicycle parts—when that sum meets a fur-
ther structuring condition—a principle of unity, such as being arranged
so as to enable locomotion on two wheels by peddling.47 (IV) One
mereological sum can constitute two different structured wholes, at
least at different times: I reject uniqueness of composition.48 (V) One
structured whole can be constituted by two different mereological sums,
44 I explore some of its explanatory potential in work on the nature of intuitive
knowledge; (Chudnoff ms).
45 (Rea 1997) contains papers representing a variety of views on the nature of mate-
rial constitution.
46 You might say, speaking loosely, that some tinker-toys constitute a model of the
Eiffel Tower. What this means, speaking strictly, is that some tinker-toys compose
a mereological sum of tinker-toys, which sum constitutes a model of the Eiffel
Tower.
47 I am borrowing the term ‘‘principle of unity’’ from Johnston; see (Johnston 2004
and 2006).
48 This is possible—I think—because a mereological sum might satisfy different prin-
ciples of unity, at least at different times. If you think that principles of unity are
themselves parts of structured wholes then you might want to give (IV) up; cf.
(Koslicki 2008).
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at least at different times: I reject mereological essentialism.49 (VI) Con-
stitution at a time entails coincidence in location at that time.50
Since the paradigm relata of the constitution relation are material
objects, you might wonder what motivation there is to think it ever
holds between experiences. The reason I will give is that there are many
examples in which it is natural to think of the relationship between two
experiences—or between a sum of experiences and an experience—as
constitution.
Consider, for one example, the following:
(E1) A sum of auditory impressions of various notes A, B, C…
(E2) The experience of hearing a melody ABC…
(E1) is not identical to (E2): it is possible for (E1) to exist without
(E2)—though it might not be possible for (E2)—that very experience—to
exist without (E1).51 Further, (E1) does not cause (E2). Rather, (E1)
‘‘amounts to’’ (E2) provided some structuring condition is met, such as
that earlier auditory impressions raise expectations that later auditory
impressions fulfill. These observations suggest to me that it is natural to
think (E1) constitutes (E2). For another example, consider the following:
(E3) A sum of conscious thoughts about various properties of bik-
ing ⁄driving to work.
(E4) The experience of consciously considering whether to bike or
drive to work.
(E3) is not identical to (E4): it is possible for (E3) to exist without
(E4), and, perhaps, it is even possible for (E4) to exist without
49 This is compatible with thinking that for some structured wholes it is essential that
they be constituted by a certain mereological sum—perhaps just at a certain distin-
guished point in their careers, such as their origin. If this is so for some structured
wholes, then, on my view, it is so because of their natures, not because of the nat-
ure of constitution.
50 I understand location broadly. Lumps of clay and statues are spatial beings, so
when they coincide in location they coincide in spatial location. Experiences, let us
suppose, are not spatial beings, so when they coincide they do not coincide, in any
non-trivial sense in spatial location. Rather, they coincide in location in a stream
of consciousness. For the purposes of this paper, I must take this notion of a loca-
tion in a stream of consciousness as primitive.
51 One might resist the claim that it is possible for (E1) to exist without (E2). A differ-
ent claim that will do the same work is this: it is not part of the essence of (E1)
that it represent a melody.
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(E3)—say because you think about different properties of biking ⁄driv-
ing to work.52 Further, (E3) does not cause (E4). Rather, (E3)
‘‘amounts to’’ (E4) provided some structuring condition is met, say that
the thoughts in (E3) are appropriately guided by an intention to decide
whether to bike or drive to work. These observations suggest to me
that it is natural to think (E3) constitutes (E4). While there is plenty of
room for debate about the specifics of the two examples that I have
presented, they should illustrate how it can be natural to invoke the
constitution relation in understanding the relationship between certain
experiences.
Given some understanding of the constitution relation and some
motivation for thinking it holds between experiences, it is natural to
ask: what collection of experiences is supposed to constitute a given
intuition experience?
Take, for example, Albert’s intuition experience representing that
diameters determine lines of symmetry. What collection of experiences
constitutes this intuition experience? It is, I maintain, some subset of the
collection of Albert’s reflections on the proposition that diameters deter-
mine lines of symmetry, that is, those thoughts and imaginings Albert
has in trying to get clearer on what circles, diameters, and lines of symme-
try are. This collection might include, for example, Albert’s visualization
of a circle, Albert’s visualizations of some diameters of that circle,
Albert’s experiences of imagining folding the circle over its diameters,
various thoughts Albert has while engaging in these imaginative endeav-
ors, etc. In general, your intuition experience representing that p is con-
stituted by (some of) your reflections on the proposition that p.53
This suggestion is likely to raise a worry. Suppose from time t1 to tN
Albert reflects on circles, diameters, and lines of symmetry, and Albert
has an intuition experience representing that diameters determine lines of
symmetry. If (some of) Albert’s reflections constitute his intuition experi-
ence, then his intuition experience shouldn’t persist beyond tN. But—it
seems—intuition experiences often persist beyond reflections. That is, on
the face of it, Albert might very well seem to intuit that diameters deter-
mine line of symmetry at tN+1. What, according to the view I have been
defending, might be happening in such a case? A number of different
things might happen. I will briefly consider four.
52 Once again these claims about possibilities can be replaced by claims about
essences.
53 This is a claim about what the constituents of an intuition experience are. I have
not advanced a thesis about what structuring conditions such constituents must
meet in order to constitute an intuition experience—that is, a thesis about the prin-
ciples of unity for intuition experiences. This is an important topic, but I do not
have the space here to address it.
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1. At tN+1 Albert no longer has an intuition experience; he just
retains a conscious inclination to believe that diameters deter-
mine lines of symmetry.
2. Albert took his intuition experience at face value, and so
formed an intuitive belief that diameters determine lines of
symmetry, and this intuitive belief remains conscious at tN+1.
3. At tN+1 Albert continues to have an intuition experience; but
his intuition experience is now constituted by his retention in
immediate memory of past reflections, not by present reflections.
4. At tN+1 Albert continues to have an intuition experience; but
his intuition experience is now constituted by his mere holding
in mind the proposition that circles are symmetrical about their
diameters.
(1) and (2) are cases in which Albert’s intuition does not persist beyond
his reflections. In both, something conscious persists beyond Albert’s
reflections, but it is not an intuition experience. In case (1) what persists
is a conscious inclination to believe. In case (2) what persists is a belie-
f—albeit not a just any kind of belief, but, rather, an intuitive judgment.
(3) and (4) depend on the claim that intuition experiences can be
variably constituted. There is some phenomenological evidence that
cases like (3) and (4) do occur. Suppose you stop reflecting on p, but
persist in having an intuition experience representing that p, and that
this experience is now constituted by a retention in immediate memory
of your past reflections, or perhaps your mere holding in mind the
proposition that p. Then it is plausible that the force with which p
strikes you will likely be diminished. It will likely be diminished in a
way that is similar to the way that the force of a retained past percep-
tion is often diminished.54 And, indeed, this is something that we do
experience. Descartes points out a similar phenomenon when he
describes the felt difference between his thought that 2 + 3 = 5 when
he is reflecting on the matter and when he is not.55
Some cases are cases in which intuition experiences do not really
persist beyond reflections: what really persists—in (1)-like cases—is an
inclination to believe, or—in (2)-like cases—an intuitive belief. The idea
54 I am not committing myself to any particular theory about what this felt difference
consists in. Nor am I arguing that memories are always less forceful than percep-
tions.
55 (Descartes, 1985), page 25.
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that intuition experiences persist in such cases depends on confusing
intuition experiences with inclinations to believe or with intuitive
beliefs. Other cases are cases in which intuition experiences do really
persist beyond reflections. At least some of these cases—(3)-like and
(4)-like cases—are unproblematic because what happens is that the
intuition experience is constituted by something else, either a retention
in immediate memory of past reflections or the mere holding in mind
of a proposition. Many of the examples suggesting that intuition expe-
riences can persist beyond reflections fall into these four kinds of case.
Perhaps there are others, so the issue is not closed. But I must set fur-
ther discussion of it aside for now.56
Finally, one might worry that what I have argued in the present
section is incompatible with the perceptualist agenda I pursued in
earlier sections. Doxasticists believe we have conscious thoughts and
imaginings directed at abstract matters. And now I have argued that
intuition experiences are constituted by collections of such conscious
thoughts and imaginings. So, one might wonder, how is the view I
am defending any different from doxasticism? It is different because it
is one thing to believe that there are collections of conscious thoughts
and imaginings directed at abstract matters and it is another thing to
believe that these collections of thoughts and imaginings sometimes
constitute new experiences that instantiate a new range of intentional,
phenomenal, metaphysical, and epistemological properties. Similarly,
it is one thing to believe that there are lumps of clay and it is
another thing to believe that these lumps of clay sometimes constitute
new entities, statues, that instantiate a new range of representational
and aesthetic properties. It is a virtue of my version of perceptualism
that according to it, intuition experiences are not mysterious, primi-
tive experiences that float freely from other experiences in our streams
of consciousness.
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